The European electricity market design is based on zonal markets with uniform prices. Hence, no differentiated locational price signals are provided within these zones. If intra-zonal congestion occurs due to missing grid expansion, this market design reveals its inherent incompleteness, and might lead to severe short and long-term distortions. In this paper, we study these distortions with a focus on the impact of restricted grid expansion under zonal markets. Therefore, we use a long-term model of the European electricity system and gradually restrict the allowed expansion of the transmission grid per decade. We find that the combination of an incomplete market design and restricted grid expansion leads to a misallocation of generation capacities and the inability to transport electricity to where it is needed. This results in an energy imbalance in some regions of up to 2-3 % and the difficulty to reach envisaged political targets in the power sector.
Introduction
The market design of the European single market for electricity consists of regional bidding zones, usually aligned to national borders. There is one uniform price per zone, while implicitly neglecting scarce transmission capacities within these zones. In reality, however, this simplification is often inconsistent with physical realities and hence, represents and inherent market incompleteness. In fact, aggregated zonal prices conceal important information regarding scarcities in the transmission grid that would be important to coordinate market participants in an efficient way.
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In the short term, this incompleteness is addressed by the redispatch of generation facilities: after the market clearing, generation units are requested to modify their scheduled dispatch by increasing or decreasing their production level in order to relieve congestion in the grid. An increase in generation is remunerated with the estimated variable costs, partly covered by the saved variable costs of the decreased generation. If the cost estimations were correct and the redispatch measure succeeded in finding the least cost alternative, the short-term market outcome would be optimal, i.e., statically efficient, in the case of inelastic demand. 1
In the long term, functionality of zonal markets shall be ensured by sufficient expansion of the grid infrastructure. In practice, however, grid expansion is often insufficient or at least delayed.
For Europe, 30 % of the projects listed in the Ten Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) are reported as delayed or rescheduled (ENTSO-E (2015) ). For Germany the situation is even worse: 50 % of the projects are reported as delayed (Bundesnetzagentur (2013c) ). There may be various obstacles causing delays of planned grid expansion. One of the main reasons are long and inefficient approval procedures (Schneider and Battaglini (2013) , Steinbach (2013) ). But even if approval procedures are successfully completed, the lack of public acceptance because of the landscape impacts may further delay the realization of infrastructure projects (ENTSO-E (2010), Schneider and Battaglini (2013) ). According to ENTSO-E (2015) , these obstacles account for one third of investment delays.
At the same time, due to the uniform price for all market participants, the resulting intrazonal scarcity in transmission capacities is not taken into account in the investment decisions of generation. In fact, (zonal) markets should ensure that sufficient capacity is installed to meet demand on a zonal level. However, there might be a misallocation of generation capacities within the zones due to missing locational price signals. These misallocations are exacerbated by missing grid capacities that might not allow to transport electricity to the customers. Thus, missing grid expansion might severly jeopardize the long-term functionality of zonal markets. Especially, although redispatch might induce efficient market outcomes in the short term, it does not suffice to heal the incompleteness of the market design to achieve long-term, i.e., dynamic, efficiency as locational price signals are not considered. 2 As we will show, this might induce severe inefficiencies in the market outcome, which are increasing with the level of grid restriction.
In Europe, the effect of misallocation of generators and missing transmission capacity is particularly relevant due to fundamental changes in the supply and demand structure caused by strong climate protection efforts. 3 A substantial shift from conventional to renewable generation, which 1 In practice, this result will probably not be entirely realized due to ramping constraints of redispatched power plants. Furthermore, the system operator may have restricted information and restricted access to cross-border capacities, which impedes optimality of the redispatch.
2 See (Burstedde, 2012) for a detailed discussion of the (in-)efficiencies of several redispatch designs. 3 The European Union (EU) formulated an ambitious 2030 energy strategy, including a EU domestic reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) by 40 % compared to 1990, a share of 27 % renewable energy, and a 27 % reduction in energy consumption compared to 2005 (European Commission, 2014 .
is usually far away from current generation and load centers, increases the importance of sufficient grid infrastructure. A blueprint for the described dynamics in a zonal market design with an increasing share of renewables is the case of Germany, where short-term intra-zonal congestion is removed using redispatch measures. In order to avoid situations where redispatch would be necessary but no generation capacities are available at the right location, the German Transmission System Operators (TSO) contract generation capacity in advance at locations which are expected to be relevant for future congestion relieve. This so-called grid reserve ensures locally sufficient generation capacity. Table 1 illustrates the development of the renewables share, redispatch measures as well as the grid reserve quantity. As can be seen, redispatch measures broadly increased with an increasing share of renewables, caused by missing transmission grid capacities. Meanwhile, also the grid reserve quantities increase. This development clearly shows the effect and the deficits of the zonal market design. In the literature, several papers investigate grid expansions in the short as well as in the long term. Schaber et al. (2011) analyze the importance of transmission grid expansion for the integration of renewables in Europe with a linear dispatch and investment model. They find that grid integration costs amount to 25 % of renewables investment costs. Schaber et al. (2012) analyze grid expansions for the European system in 2020 given an increasing share of wind and solar power.
A cost-minimization model of the European power system is applied under the assumption of a nodal pricing regime. Results indicate lower electricity prices in proximity of renewables and benefits for conventional plants in case of grid expansion. Optimal grid expansion amounts to 20 % respectively 60 % of today's capacity, depending on whether underground cable or overhead lines are used. Fürsch et al. (2013) quantify the benefits of optimal grid expansion up to 2050 by applying a dispatch and investment model coupled with a load flow grid model that determines NTC values for the market coupling. They compare optimal grid expansion with moderate expansion of interconnector capacities, and find that with a large share of renewables, high grid expansion (an additional 76 % capacity compared to today) proves to be optimal to exploit good renewable sites.
The linkage between renewables, grid expansion, and generation backup capacities was investigated by Steinke et al. (2013) . They use a stylized model to analyze the effects of grid expansion on the necessity of backup capacities and storage. They find that an ideal grid reduces the need of backup capacities from 40 % to 20 % with a share of 100 % renewables. Hagspiel et al. (2014) analyze the optimal grid expansion until 2050 using a linear dispatch and investment model coupled with an AC grid model via Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF). They find that minimal grid expansion for achieving an ambitious CO 2 reduction target of 90 % leads to an increase of 21 % of total system costs. Oggioni and Smeers (2012) as well as Kunz (2013) deal with the impact of zonal markets and redispatch for Germany and Europe in the short run. In doing so, Oggioni and Smeers (2012) use a six node model and Kunz (2013) a European short-term electricity market model. Grimm et al. (2016) build on a trilevel modelling approach investigating the long run impact of different market designs. They apply their theoretical model to a three and six node case study and find that investment decisions of firms and TSOs do not have to lead to the social optimum in a market environment. Bertsch et al. (2015) develop a theoretical framework to analyse and compare different market designs. In a large-scale application it is shown that zonal markets with redispatch lead to inefficiencies compared to nodal pricing, representing the first best.
We contribute to the existing literature by investigating the particular relevance of grid expansion under zonal markets. We show that the market design is inherently incomplete due to missing price signals, and that important scarcities in the grid are not properly considered for investment decisions. For this, we build on a long-term fundamental model of the European electricity market developed in Bertsch et al. (2015) , allowing the representation of the European zonal markets with redispatch. The model includes generation dispatch, power flows, as well as generation and grid investments. In contrast to Bertsch et al. (2015) , we implement the EU 2030 energy strategy to ensure the results are in line with current European policies. Furthermore, we extend the analysis by designing six scenarios that differ with respect to their level of allowed grid expansion. We are hence able to investigate in great detail the relevance of grid expansion for the market outcome.
Our results show that restricted grid expansion together with the inherent incompleteness of the market design has significant effects. We restrict grid expansion per decade from zero, i.e., no grid expansion at all, to 30 TWkm throughout six different scenarios. In case of restrictions ranging from 0-15 TWkm of grid expansion per decade, there are energy imbalances of up to 2 % (3 %) for 2020 (2030) . Also with less restricted grid expansion, these energy imbalances still amount to more than 0.2 % for scenarios 15 TWkm in 2020. In 2030, however, significant energy imbalances only occur for the scenarios of restrictions of up to 5 TWkm. The highest energy imbalances are found to be in Southern Germany. Thereby, energy imbalances indicate that generation is missing at some locations, entailing the need to either provide additional generation capacity outside of the market (e.g., by means of a grid reserve as in Germany), or to curtail load. Furthermore, no grid expansion jeopardizes the achievement of the EU 2030 climate targets: the share of renewables is 1.5 percentage points lower than in any other scenario, resulting from a curtailment of up to 7.7 % of photovoltaic (PV) generation and over 3 % of wind generation. Missing grid expansion 4 hence results in higher CO 2 emissions in the power sector and implies the need to shift CO 2 emissions from the power sector to other, probably more expensive sectors. DC lines are found to be of particular value for the integration of renewables as they allow point-to-point transfers from renewables generation to load sites.
Overall, the results demonstrate the shortfalls of the zonal market design in the light of restricted grid expansion which is a scenario that appears to be very likely. The more restricted grid expansion is, the more administrative intervention will be needed to avoid energy imbalances possibly causing expensive and politically unwanted load curtailment. One alternative might be to administratively contract generation capacity outside the market. To overcome this problem, a redefinition of zones or introduction of locational price elements may be a suitable way to effectively reduce the amount of administrative intervention. Furthermore, obstacles for grid expansion should be removed in order to ensure sufficient levels of grid to connect generation and load.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and numerical assumptions.
Results are presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology

Model
To simulate the development of the electricity system with zonal markets and redispatch, we follow the approach described in Bertsch et al. (2015) and combine a cost-minimizing dynamic linear investment and dispatch market model with a model of the AC grid using a linear Power
Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) representation of the load-flow. To deal with the non-linear dependence of the PTDFs on the grid impedances, the models are solved iteratively by updating PTDF matrices until convergence is achieved as proposed in Hagspiel et al. (2014) .
The model represents an intertemporal equilibrium model that simultaneously solves the operation and investment of generation and the transmission infrastructure. The model relies on a set of simplifying assumptions: we assume perfect competition among generators, perfect regulation of TSOs, the absence of transaction costs and uncertainty, inelastic demand, continuous expansion of generation and transmission capacities and continuous adjustment of the corresponding transmission impedances. For a thorough discussion of the model development and characteristics, the reader is referred to Bertsch et al. (2015) .
We make use of a separated representation of generation and transmission in order to represent the status quo of European electricity markets with unbundled generation and transmission firms.
The separation of the problem helps us to implement the market incompleteness induced by the zonal market design and the related information deficit. Our iterative solution algorithm is based on two stages that are solved sequentially. First, the generation market equilibrium is determined by minimizing generation and investment costs while meeting an (inelastic) demand and considering inter-zonal transmission capacities. This implies that the zonal market for electricity supply and costs while keeping the system stable, i.e., matching zonal demand and supply while ensuring that no line is overloaded. At the transmission level, either AC or DC interconnections are available.
While the DC interconnections allow direct transfers of electricity between neighboring regions, the utilization of the AC grid is subject to loop flows represented by the PTDF.
Equations (1a)- (1l) 1i). 8 The exchange between the generation and the transmission stage takes place via the inter-zonal transmission capacities P m,n,t . 9 Thereby, function g determines those inter-zonal transmission capacities for each dispatch time t (that are provided to the generation market, i.e., the first stage of the model) based on grid capacities P i,j,y , generation To demonstrate the deficiencies of the zonal market with redispatch, we can compare problem (1a)-(1l) with a two-stage nodal pricing regime representing the first-best benchmark. The corresponding model can be found in the Appendix. The main difference stems from zonal markets m, n being replaced by nodes i, j. As a consequence, TSOs need no redispatch R i,t as locational price signals are directly incorporated in the dispatch. All relevant information is available to all market participants at all times, making nodal pricing the first-best efficient benchmark. For a thorough comparison of different market designs and their performance including zonal as well as nodal pricing regimes, the reader is referred to Bertsch et al. (2015) .
8 In our case power flows are represented by PTDFs that are treated as a parameter while solving the transmission stage, such that Equation (1i) becomes a linear constraint. However, we account for non-linearities in the load flow equations by updating PTDFs based on the new transmission capacities when iterating with the AC grid model.
9 Note that this approach differs from Bertsch et al. (2015) , where the exchange worked via transmission capacity marginals.
10 Note that we use j, k and q as alias for i in order to represent different nodes in the formulation.
Numerical assumptions
The geographical scope of the simulation, as shown in Figure 1 , contains a high-resolution nodal representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, and an aggregated representation of the neighboring countries. 11 The CWE region consists of 5 zonal markets where nodes within the zones are aggregated and zones correspond to national borders (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France) that are coupled via inter-zonal transmission capacities offered to the market. Due to limitations in publicly available data and models, our approach to the zonal coupling only considers cross-border line capacities. Note that in practice, the mechanism applied in the CWE region may in addition include some intra-zonal congestion in the capacity allocation. 12
Physical feasibility of the dispatch on the grid level is ensured by a cross-border redispatch. 11 With this simplification we neglect that a detailed representation of all countries would probably impact congestion in the CWE region.
12 For further technical details, see CWE FBMC (2014).
13 Although Austria is currently in the same bidding zone as Germany, we treat it as part of the Southern Europe. This has two main reasons: First, numerical complexity is reduced and second, the effect on the results in case Austria is included with higher granularity is expected to be limited. The data for the power plants stems from the power plant database developed at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. This database comprises nearly all European power plants greater than 10 MW and is constantly updated by publicly available sources (e.g., the power plant list of the German regulator) and the Platts WEPP database (Platts, 2009) . 15 The grid model was developed based on the publicly available map and data on the European transmission grid infrastructures from ENTSO-E. 17 This value was chosen to represent typical returns on investment. Note that the costs of capital for investments in the electricity sector are hard to estimate, but considering the rate of return for regulated investments (e.g., around 9 % for grid expansion projects in Germany) this seems to be a fair assumption.
18 Typical days are constructed such that they represent statistical features of electricity demand as well as of 9 are coupled to account for seasonal storage, and include one day to cover extreme weather events.
CO 2 emissions are constrained according to the European targets shown in Table 2 We assume there is no explicit target for either the share or capacity of renewables in addition to the CO 2 mechanism, meaning that renewables are deployed endogenously due to CO 2 restrictions.
However, we will report the deployment of renewables and discuss the implications for the European 27 % renewables goal in total energy consumption in Section 3. In addition, we assume that the production of PV and wind (onshore and offshore) can be curtailed. This might be necessary if the production of PV and wind capacities exceed the demand in this region and transmission capacities are insufficient to transport the production to other regions. Despite the goals on energy efficiency, the electricity consumption is projected to increase, e.g., due to electrification of heating processes and transportation. Electricity demand is taken from the EU energy road map (European Commission (2013)).
As the most important trigger in our analysis, we model different scenarios varying the restriction levels for grid expansion, as indicated in Due to the imposed constraint on grid expansion, the model may become unable to fully serve demand (except for Scenario 30 where grid restrictions are not binding). Due to missing local price signals, the market equilibrium might lead to an allocation of generators far away from load centers.
Specifically, if transmission capacities are limited, and the congestion in the grid cannot be fully resolved by redispatching generation, energy imbalances occur. Those imbalances can be solved in various ways to ensure technical feasibility. On the demand side, one possibility to overcome an imbalance is load curtailment which is, however, usually avoided as much as possible due to the high value of lost load. In our model, we allow to curtail load with a value of lost load (VOLL) of 7.41 e per kWh (Growitsch et al., 2015) . This rather high value forces the model to curtail load as a last resort to ensure feasibility. However, one may also think of other measures to relieve imbalances. In fact, measures on the supply side are much more prominent. Additional generation capacities could be contracted in an administrative procurement (i.e., outside the market) to ensure security of supply even in critical situations. This procedure is applied in Germany, for instance. Figure 2 shows the yearly energy imbalances in all scenarios, i.e., the mismatch between supply and demand after adjusting the dispatch with a physically feasible redispatch and grid expansion.
Results
Impacts of missing grid expansion
Redispatch and energy imbalances
Energy imbalances might occur due to missing grid infrastructure (if grid expansion is restricted)
together with a misallocation of generation capacities. These factors may lead to the fact that not all load in all regions can be served given the installed grid and generation infrastructure. Scenario 0 shows the highest level of energy imbalances as no grid expansion is allowed and redispatch measures are insufficient. In the CWE region, energy imbalances of around 2 % of total load in 2020 and nearly 3 % in 2030 if no grid expansion are observed. All other scenarios result in energy imbalances of below 0.5 % in all years. With an increase of the allowed grid expansion, energy imbalances are reduced.
Due to increasing wind capacities built up in the North of Germany without taking into account the ability to transport this generation to load centers in the South, the most severe energy imbalances are in Southern Germany. However, due to the meshed grid energy imbalances also Figure 3 shows the regional distribution and severity of energy imbalances in Scenario 0 for 2030. 20 The distribution in the other scenarios is similar, but lower. Noticeably, energy imbalances increase over time in Scenario 0, while they decrease in all other scenarios. This is due to the inter-temporal effect of grid expansion (cf. Section 3.2.2).
The overall quantity of redispatch measures shows a similar behavior over the scenarios as the energy imbalances, and are highest for the most restricted case (Figure 4) . However, the decline in redispatch with a less restricted grid expansion is not as steep as for energy imbalances. 
Total system costs
Total system costs are a measure for the overall efficiency of the system. Intuitively, a system with more constrained grid expansion induces higher system costs. For the different scenarios, we find that no grid expansion at all increases total system costs by 138 % compared to the unrestricted case. Figure 7 shows the dependence of total system costs on grid expansion. It can be seen that even a small amount of grid expansion decreases total system costs drastically.
To further analyze this result, Table 4 shows the composition of total systems costs (discounted to e 2011 ). The main variation between the scenarios results from differences in the costs to relieve energy imbalances between the scenarios where grid expansion is restricted. The increase of costs aligned to the removal of energy imbalances arises from sub-optimal siting of generators. Due to the market design which is unable to uncover scarcities in the grid within a bidding zone by means of appropriate price signals, investments are made based on supply site characteristics only. As a result, there is not enough generation capacity available at every node and it is furthermore not possible to import sufficient capacity without grid expansion. This in turn leads to situations where redispatch measures trying to overcome internal grid restrictions in each bidding zone are not sufficient any more. Hence, energy imbalances have to be relieved at high costs. In the most extreme scenario with no grid expansion at all, this leads to the additional effect that the implemented CO 2 quota cannot be fulfilled anymore by the electricity sector, meaning that some other sectors have to increase their CO 2 reduction efforts. 21 21 The shifting of CO2 emissions is not explicitly included in the applied modelling framework. Remarkable -while looking at the results on total system costs -is the fact that grid expansion costs are rather low compared to any other cost factor and almost negligible if generation and grid costs are compared. The non-monotonous trend of the grid costs over the scenarios can be explained by the included redispatch costs, which depend on the optimization of the generation and not the transmission level. 
Fulfillment of the EU 2030 targets
In case of no grid expansion (Scenario 0 ), the amount of CO 2 emissions that have to be reduced by other sectors (than the power sector) within the EU-ETS amounts to 176 mt CO 2 in 2020 and 391 mt CO 2 per year in 2030. These numbers should be interpreted with care, as feedback loops with other sectors covered by the EU ETS that are induced by an increasing CO 2 -price are not considered here. However, the general result that CO 2 emissions are shifted to other sectors should probably hold.
To deal with restricted grid expansion, generation from renewable resources may be curtailed. 22
As can be seen in Figure 8 , the need to curtail the production of renewables decreases dramatically as the restriction of grid expansion is relaxed. In 2030, 7.7 % of available PV generation is curtailed in the case of no grid expansion, which drops to just 0.4 % if 5 TWkm/10a are allowed.
The drop for onshore wind from 3.3 % to 1.4 % is less dramatic. Furthermore, the regional dis- Considering the three main targets of European energy policy consisting of a secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy, our results show that missing grid expansion might degrade these targets. Especially with no or only minimal grid expansion, energy imbalances, the fulfillment of the implemented CO 2 quota as well as total system costs increase substantially compared to scenarios with less extreme grid restrictions. Thus, it can be concluded that grid expansions are of high importance in order to meet the European energy targets. In Figure 9 and 10, it can be seen that the AC network is extended significantly more than the DC network. One reason is that there are simply more AC connections available to the optimizer to extend; only DC connections that already exist and those planned in the TYNDP 2012 are fed into the initial network topology for optimization. Another reason is that DC lines are more expensive because of the costs of the AC-DC converter stations at each end of the line. 25 However, 24 In the optimal grid scenario considered by Hagspiel et al. (2014) , the grid for the entire ENTSO-E area was extended by 48 % between 2011 and 2030.
25 See Table 9 in the Appendix for the transmission cost assumptions the decrease in DC capacities with a restriction of more than 20 TWkm per decade indicates that DC lines are prioritized when the grid restrictions are enforced. The share of DC in the total network expansion decreases monotonically as the grid restrictions are relaxed (see Figure 10) .
In absolute terms, for the total period 2011-2030, the DC expansion increases, peaks at just over double the existing DC capacity, and then decrease as the grid restrictions disappear. In Figure   9 it can be seen that DC capacity increases as the overall capacity limit increases in each decade, but only as long as the overall grid restriction for AC and DC is binding. When grid restrictions are no longer binding for a decade (Scenario 30 for 2011-2020 and Scenario 20 for 2020-2030), the DC capacity drops as cheaper AC lines are prioritized over extending DC lines. This shows that DC lines help the system to deal with the grid expansion restrictions and to compensate missing AC lines. A reason for preferring DC to AC is that the power flow is more controllable, so that power transfers can be directed over long distances, rather than spreading out in the AC network in "loop flows", which overload wide areas of the AC network. This underlines the importance of DC lines for example to integrate renewable energies into the system. As a result, whenever grid restrictions are in place, DC lines allow a better system optimum.
Inter-temporal effects
In Figure Figure 11 shows the geographical distribution of the grid expansion for three scenarios including the optimal grid from Scenario 30. Noticeably, many of the grid expansion are concentrated in
Geographical distribution
France and its borders with other countries. This results from the good wind resources in France, that are located particularly along its coastline. The electrical load along the coast is weak, so network extensions are needed to transport the wind power to load centers elsewhere in Europe.
26 Recall that 2040 and 2050 are also included in the optimization in order to avoid end-time effects.
These good wind resources are currently under-exploited, but represent the cheapest option to decrease CO 2 emissions in the CWE region. This better use of cheap wind resources in France is also reflected in the grid expansion (see Figure   11 ). There is a small drop in solar capacity of 3.8 GW in the British Isles, as grid expansion allow Scenario 30 there is a 53 TWh/a increase in wind generation, almost exclusively due to the extra wind capacity in France but also due to reduced curtailment of renewables in France, the Netherlands and Germany, as grid bottlenecks ease. Solar generation increases by 6 TWh/a despite the lower capacity, due to lower renewable curtailment in France and particularly in Germany. Gas generation is reduced by 63 TWh/a and replaced by CO 2 -free renewable generation as well as lignite generation, primarily from Central Eastern European countries (increasing by 31 TWh/a). This substitution of gas with lignite as grid capacity increases is induced by lower fuel costs of lignite than gas, which outweigh its higher CO 2 emissions per kWh. There is also 8 GWh/a more coal generation in the Iberian peninsular, enabled by the grid expansion between Spain and France.
The distribution of generation capacity is in general very insensitive to grid expansion because of the way the grid and market are coupled. In the initial dispatch and generation capacity optimization the internal grid constraints of each country are not visible; the internal bottlenecks only become apparent in the next step, as redispatch is performed in each bidding zone. However, the redispatch does not directly affect the optimality of the investment and dispatch decisions in 20 the market. The only impact stems from the indirect effect of altered interconnection capacities, which become visible in the scenarios with little grid expansion.
The capacity and generation of pumped hydro storage and hydro storage dams remains nearly constant throughout all scenarios, which shows that the role of these types of storage in the system is not influenced by restrictions on grid expansion. Thus, storage is no substitute for grid expansion.
Pump storage capacity is highest in the Southern region (Switzerland, Austria and Italy) whereas hydro storage capacity is highest in Northern Europe (mainly Norway) followed by the southern region (22 and 14 GW). However, as the potential in these countries is already mostly exhausted, there are no capacity expansion in these regions. Nevertheless, the value of storage is demonstrated when looking at the United Kingdom (UK) where pump storage capacity increases from 3 to 6 GW when grid expansion are highly restricted and to only 5 GW in the less restricted scenarios. At the same time the good and until now not exhausted wind resources in the UK are explored and thus wind capacities increase from 10 GW in 2011 to roughly 72 GW in 2030 throughout all scenarios.
As exports to other countries are limited, other sources of demand to absorb this wind generation are needed. Therefore, storage is built. Thus, for the very special case of the UK, storage is a substitute to extending the DC connections (which are limited) to the rest of the CWE region. In addition, grid bottlenecks in France prevent imports of wind power from the UK, which may also drive the expansion of storage capacity in the UK when grid expansions are restricted.
Conclusion
We investigated the effect of restricted grid expansion for the EU's 2030 energy strategy under the current market design. Specifically, we contributed to the existing literature an in-depth analysis of the long-term effect of grid expansion restrictions in zonal markets with redispatch after market clearing. If grid expansions are restricted, this market design reveals its inherent incompleteness, because zonal markets fail to provide efficient locational price signals. Our analysis was based on a large-scale model of the European electricity market with a focus on the Central Western European region. We used a linear model covering the generation and transmission level with endogenous investment and dispatch decisions for both levels. Restrictions for grid expansion were implemented and gradually tightened, reaching from optimal expansion to no expansion.
We found that the incompleteness of the market design leads to a misallocation of generation capacities and the inability of the system to transport electricity to where it is needed. Thus, energy imbalances occur. Although they decrease sharply if some grid expansion is allowed, we still see energy imbalances even for an allowed grid expansion of 15 TWkm per decade. Affected regions are mainly those that are characterized by poor conditions for renewables, i.e., comparably low wind speeds and low solar radiation, and far away from (new) generation sites. Most severe energy imbalances appear in Southern Germany. These imbalances indicate the need for additional measures that have to be undertaken in order to ensure system stability, either affecting the demand or the supply side. On the supply side, imbalances can be solved by procuring additional capacity, while on the demand side load curtailment would be necessary. In practice, however, the latter is observed very rarely and usually avoided as much as possible. Therefore, supply side measures are more frequently used, e.g., by contracting additional generation capacity outside the market to ensure security of supply. For example, Germany administratively procures additional generation capacity, especially in Southern Germany where significant imbalances occur.
The restriction on grid expansion has a visible effect on European climate targets only if no or very little grid expansion is allowed. With no grid expansion, the renewables share is 1.5 percentage points lower compared to the other scenarios. As a consequence, conventional generation with higher CO 2 emissions has to jump in, such that the indirect effect of rising CO 2 abatement costs appears. One approach to deal with restricted grid expansion is the utilization of DC instead of AC lines. When overall grid expansion is restricted, DC can bring advantages by directing long-distance power flows, which would otherwise cause loop-flows in the AC network causing wide-spread overloading.
In order to overcome the depicted shortcomings of the zonal market design, several options are available. First, the obstacles of grid expansion could be removed to avoid intra-zonal congestion.
As pointed out earlier, the main obstacles are approval procedures as well as social opposition which would need to be addressed by all involved parties. However, from past experience, it seems unlikely that grid expansion could be completely avoided in the future. Thus, an adaptation of the current market design should be considered as a second option. As has been shown, the prevailing market design is inherently incomplete, which may have severe consequences, especially when facing substantial changes in the supply structure. Hence, additional measures are needed, such as administrative intervention to ensure sufficient levels of generation capacity outside the market (as it is currently handled in Germany by contracting existing and procuring newly built capacity as a grid reserve for redispatch), different shapes of price zones, or via an implementation of locational price elements into the market. Moreover, the issue of the right location should also play a role when designing renewable support schemes, since they are the main driver of the changing infrastructure. Grid Technology Extension costs FOM costs AC overhead line incl. compensation 445 e/(MVA*km) 2.2 e/(MVA*km) DC overhead line 400 e/(MW*km) 2.0 e/(MW*km) DC underground 1250 e/(MW*km) 6.3 e/(MW*km) DC submarine 1100 e/(MW*km) 5.5 e/(MW*km) DC converter pair 150000 e/MW 750.0 e/MW 
